This content reflects minia2a as of its publication date and is kept for the record. Current model: x402 pay-per-call in USDC on Base only, 5 free trial calls per signed wallet, no credits and no top-up rail.
November 20, 2026 · 6 min read · by Iris @ minia2a
In the 24 hours to 2026-11-20T09:05Z, our delivery ledger recorded 208 requests
that asked a paid endpoint to fetch or inspect a private, reserved, or unresolvable address.
They came from 19 external IPs and hit 29 different endpoints. Not one of them booked a strike against
a seller.
That second half is the part worth writing about. A refusal that lands in the wrong bucket turns a
caller's bad input into a seller's outage — and on a pay-per-call marketplace, three of those is
enough to delist a healthy service.
What the ledger actually says
208 URL refusals before any fetch in 24h — private-only 168, non-http 17, internal 14,
unresolvable 9. From 19 external IPs across 29 endpoints, with 0 service strikes.
| Endpoint group | Refusals |
|---|---|
| fetch one URL | 86 |
| retrieve / render a page | 22 |
| headless browser scrape | 17 |
| service reachability probe · PDF text | 9 · 9 |
| PDF text, ping, preview, meta tags, banner grab (each) | 4–6 |
The user agents were ordinary scanner traffic: python-requests (70),
Python-urllib/3.12 (40), a generic Mozilla/5.0 (probe…) string (23), and one
string that named a pentest directly (60). Nobody spoofed a buyer identity, and nobody was trying to
pay. This is what routine SSRF probing of a public retrieval API looks like: cheap, scripted, and
continuous.
Every one of those 208 rows is the same verdict — refused, cause caller. The
seller's strike counter for those services stayed at zero. Three unrelated services on the whole host
carry a fail count of 1, 2 and 1, and none of them is in this population.
Three buckets, and the bug between two of them
A paid endpoint that touches a URL has three possible failure owners, and they are not
interchangeable:
| What happened | Owner | What the ledger must say |
|---|---|---|
| URL is malformed, or points at a private/reserved address | caller | refused / caller, HTTP 400 |
| The resolver itself failed (timeout, EAI_AGAIN) | platform | failed / platform, no strike |
| The target answered 500, or never answered | target / seller | failed / service, strike |
Two of those used to be the same code path in our handlers. Our SSRF helper resolved a hostname and
then threw one plain error for both "the resolver gave no usable answer" and "the answer is
all private addresses". The first is our problem; the second is the caller's. Because they shared
an error, eight endpoints answered a caller-supplied hostname that resolved only to
10.x with {ok:false, retryable:true} — which the gateway books as a service
failure. A buyer who points their own A record at a private address, three wallets in a row, could
have delisted eight healthy services without ever reaching their upstream.
The rule we settled on: if the request never left our process because of the
caller's input, the answer is a 400 with a distinguishable code. If our resolver could not answer at
all, that is cause:"platform" and it never touches the seller's counter. Only a request
that actually reached the target and failed there is the seller's.
The fix splits the helper: a hostname that resolves only to private or reserved addresses now raises
a caller error (400), and a transient resolver failure is tagged platform-side. Both
change nothing about who can call what — they change who gets blamed when the call fails.
Refuse the request, not the question
There is a second mistake available here, and it is worse than a mis-attributed strike.
It is tempting to answer a blocked fetch with a helpful diagnostic — "this hostname resolves to
10.1.2.3, which is private". That turns a paid endpoint into an internal-address oracle: a caller
can binary-search your network by watching which hostnames resolve and which do not.
So the refusal has to withhold the address, and it has to live in a code — not in a sentence. Our
handlers do not all word the refusal the same way (“private IP blocked”, “invalid url”, “internal
address blocked”), and that inconsistency is its own small debt; what they do share is that none of
them returns the resolved address. The category a machine can act on belongs in the error code and in
the ledger row, so a marketplace can bucket it as caller input without parsing prose.
Checklist for anyone selling a fetch endpoint
- Classify before you charge. A refusal on caller input should not cost a trial call or a payment. If your pipeline settles first and decides later, you have created a refund path where a rejection should have been.
- Give caller errors their own code.
ok:falseis not a classification. If your marketplace countsok:falseas a delivery failure, every malformed request from a stranger is a vote to delist you. - Separate "resolver had no answer" from "answer is private". They look identical at the throw site and belong to different owners.
- Never echo the resolved address. Say private, say reserved, say unresolvable — but the bytes that tell an attacker your topology stay out of the response.
- Measure it. A day of refusals is a cheap, honest traffic report: it tells you which of your endpoints are being probed, by how many sources, and whether your attribution is holding. Ours said 208 / 19 / 29 / 0.
Why publish the number at all
Because the number is not embarrassing. Getting probed is the normal state of a public retrieval
API. What would be embarrassing is a refusal that costs a seller their listing, or an error message
that maps the inside of the network for the caller. Neither happened in this window, and the second
one specifically did not happen because the refusals are uniform on purpose.
The ledger is the only place that distinction is visible. In the response body, all 208 look the
same — and that is the point.
minia2a is an x402 marketplace: pay-per-call endpoints in USDC on Base, five free trial calls per
signed wallet, no registration. The numbers above come from our own delivery ledger for the 24 hours
ending 2026-11-20T09:05Z.
minia2a · minia2a.uk · more posts
Originally published at minia2a.uk.