AI & ML
I2C-GRPO: Insight Importance Checklist for Reinforcement Learning in a Multi-Agent DDoS Alert Triage Workflow
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.17534v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for investigative tasks over incomplete evidence, such as cybersecurity alert triage, but reinforcement learning (RL) for such tasks is difficult: intermediate steps have no verifiable labels, rollouts are costly, and outcome rewards are sparse. We propose Insight Importance Checklist (I2C)-GRPO, a checklist reward for intermediate investigation steps. For each decision point, a panel of expert LLMs proposes investigative actions, their atomic forensic insights are extracted, and a separate three-model ranker panel orders the insights by importance. A reward model checks which ranked insights a candidate action targets and returns their consensus-weighted coverage. Because actions are scored without being executed, the reward is a proxy for expected investigative value, and training reduces to a one-step contextual bandit over fixed investigation prefixes. From a soft-computing perspective, the reward is an additive fuzzy measure whose rank-exponent weights act as an ordered weighted averaging (OWA)-type operator; one exponent sets its orness, i.e., how strongly the reward concentrates on the top of the judges' consensus. We train an open-weight Qwen3-4B Triage Agent within a fixed multi-agent Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) alert-triage workflow on DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 and test it on an independent CSE-CIC-IDS2018 DDoS trace. Across three training seeds, the agent reaches a mean F1-score of 0.869, 5.9 and 9.7 points above uniform insight weights and DIVA, and a false-positive rate of 4.9% versus 16.4% for GPT-5-mini. Within the weighting family, false positives fall only at the highest-orness weighting evaluated. All claims are limited to DDoS alert triage; the code, task contexts, and ranked insight dataset will be released.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17534PreviousCan LLMs Write Backdoors? An Empirical Security Study of Weight-Space ProgrammingNextOnline Allocation with Differential Privacy
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