arXiv:2611.24135v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Post-update attestation proves that a device installed the intended firmware, not that the image stayed protected until the report was signed. In a multi-master SoC, a master outside the attested processor can corrupt update-critical memory. In contrast, the firmware identity, lifecycle state, and the CPU's protection evidence remain byte-identical to a healthy device's. We present PULSAR-V, a post-update attestation architecture which binds the authenticated update commit to the effective permissions and immutability of both gates (PMP/EPMP on the CPU, the I/O policy mediating DMA), sampled at the commit and at attestation, the I/O gate latching its own commit-time state in hardware. In a RISC-V SoC prototyped on a ZCU102 FPGA (CV32E40S core with 16 PMP regions, IOPMP-style unit, AXI write guard), a 256-byte write from the board's Arm DMA engine bypasses PMP and corrupts the committed image: every conventional claim stays true, and PULSAR-V rejects the device on its I/O-policy evidence alone. It also rejects an intact device whose policy left the image writable, a verdict no integrity check can reach. The gate and its commit latch cost 436 LUTs, 4.6% of the SoC, and evidence collection takes 43.1k cycles independent of image size, 41x less than re-hashing 16 KiB.