arXiv:2609.00519v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safeguards for large language model services are typically evaluated by their attack-blocking rates on test suites. Deployment decisions also depend on how much harmful assistance attackers can still obtain from the system, which these rates do not measure. To determine what published evaluations establish about deployment safety, we develop a framework that translates reported results into the minimum and maximum harmful assistance that can remain under a specified outcome and threat model. For safeguards that block attacks through a check, we show that the most an attacker can obtain depends on three properties: whether attack paths pass through the check, its miss rate against every attacker in the threat model, and how much assistance remains after a block. We apply this framework to 85 safeguard evaluations from 52 papers. Of these, only five argue that every attack path passes through the check, and four provide evidence on what remains after a block. These evidence gaps have practical consequences: in NeMo Guardrails' default streaming configuration, the check blocked 94% of password leaks in our test, yet the client received the password in every leak, blocked or not. We identify which of the three properties each safeguard category's evaluations omit, and what to measure for each of four ways attacks bypass a check. Deployments that require these measurements before launch can choose and configure safeguards that limit what attackers obtain from the deployed system.