arXiv:2611.05806v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Office documents are now routinely uploaded to large language models (LLMs) for processing. However, an LLM does not always see what a human sees, because it typically reads the text that an extractor produces from the document's underlying Office Open XML (OOXML) files. Depending on the implementation, extractors differ in which OOXML parts they read and how they interpret them, so their output can differ from what Office applications display. For example, by slightly shifting the positions of text boxes on a slide, an adversary can swap the order in which the model reads them while the slide looks unchanged. We show that this extraction divergence is an attack surface for LLM applications. In this work, we first measure what an adversary can exploit by analyzing the widely used extractors that LLM applications rely on. By combining static source code analysis with dynamic analysis, we identify 19 OOXML channels where extractors read content a human cannot see and 12 where they drop content a human can. We also find that widely used extractors ignore display formatting and reading order, so even visible content reaches the model in a different form. Building on these findings, we construct five attacks that lead the model to interpret a document differently from a human reviewer, without injecting any instruction. We test the attacks on four major chat assistants (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Microsoft 365 Copilot) and four coding agents (Codex, Claude Code, Antigravity, and GitHub Copilot CLI), and every one of them is misled by at least one attack. Finally, we propose Prism, a lightweight defense that reconstructs the human view from the OOXML specification before passing the text to the model. Prism also generalizes to unseen attack payloads.