arXiv:2609.35909v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents turn vulnerability discovery into a repository-scale search: they generate many vulnerability hypotheses but can verify only a subset under a finite budget. We show that autonomous vulnerability discovery exhibits a hypothesis-verification asymmetry, where verifying a candidate hypothesis through reachability analysis, execution, and proof-of-concept construction is substantially more expensive than forming it. Under a finite resource budget, this makes autonomous discovery a resource-bounded selective-verification process, further exposing verification effort as a unique defense surface. We present RedHerring, which inserts certifiably safe decoys that divert verification effort from real vulnerabilities. Each decoy combines a CVE-derived vulnerability chain that attracts verification with a false bridge that keeps its dangerous sink unreachable. A private certificate lets the defender verify this property efficiently, while establishing the same fact from the released repository requires solving a computationally hard problem. RedHerring further adapts each decoy to the target repository so that it reads as ordinary program logic. Across 33 OSS-Fuzz projects, 70 evaluation instances, and five models under matched budgets, RedHerring reduces real vulnerabilities discovered by 38.7-60.4%. Trajectory analysis shows that agents spend 30.6-51.5% of completion tokens and an estimated 32.5-49.9% of runtime verifying decoys, showing that RedHerring redirects a substantial fraction of the fixed search budget toward decoys. When explicitly informed that decoys may be present, the agent adapts its search strategy, yet RedHerring still reduces vulnerabilities discovered by 37.2% relative to an informed Baseline, showing that its effectiveness does not depend on decoy secrecy.