arXiv:2610.12695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs), such as AMD SEV-SNP, and process enclaves, such as Intel SGX, provide workload protection against cloud threats. However, they strongly differ in TCB, deployment cost and speed, peer workload protection, resource sharing, fine-grained isolation and attestation, and programming capabilities. Nesting process enclaves within CVMs offers an optimal solution and an opportunity to address long-standing SGX limitations: lack of intra-enclave protection, expensive transitions and exception paths, slow enclave cloning, and a restricted programming model that limits Library Operating Systems (LibOS). This paper introduces TEEVisor, a CVM-resident architecture consisting of a security monitor and a kernel driver that leverages AMD SEV-SNP Virtual Machine Privilege Levels (VMPLs) to build hardware-protected, process-level enclaves inside a guest CVM with two modes: (1) an SGX binary compatibility mode to run unmodified SGX applications; and (2) a novel extended SGX~(eSGX) mode optimizing slow execution paths and offering richer enclave programming capabilities. On commercial AMD EPYC hardware, against native CVM execution, TEEVisor incurs under 5% overhead on compute- and memory-bound workloads, around 12% on I/O-heavy applications, and accelerates enclave cloning to a rate of 93~$\mu$s/MB of enclave size, demonstrating that eSGX semantics inside a CVM are practical for production use.