arXiv:2610.22459v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoors are among the most impactful attacks against Machine Learning (ML), yet most existing methods assume some form of training-time poisoning or direct model manipulation. This is often considered sufficient to assume that existing systems are not exposed to actual risks. In this paper, we introduce Backdoor-as-a-Service, a model-agnostic, fully black-box technique that, instead of installing a backdoor, activates it in the form of a latent secondary task leveraging on an already present behavior. Our tool uses genetic search to discover input transformations that induce systematic output differences aligned with an attacker-defined task, without modifying training data, architecture, or weights. We verify our approach against two targets. First, we target a MNIST digits classifier that we coerce into implementing a binary letter-recognition task. Then, we attack a production-grade NSFW classifier using face-specific perturbations to turn it into a proxy for demographic-group classification. In both cases, our method successfully enables the target backdoor. Finally, we discuss the existing countermeasures to assess the actual risk for the deployed systems.