arXiv:2601.12360v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: CI/CD pipelines often execute build and test tasks with high privileges, making the compilation stage security-sensitive. In this setting, malicious pull requests may exploit carefully crafted source code to trigger arbitrary code execution or excessive resource consumption during compilation, making compiler vulnerabilities security-relevant. Recent work has leveraged bug-prone knowledge from historical bugs to drive compiler exploration and bug discovery. However, many compiler bugs depend on program semantics rather than syntax, and existing approaches either rely on syntactic mutation or encode this knowledge in model parameters, making it difficult to preserve and recombine the semantics that actually trigger compiler bugs. We propose FeatureFuzz, a compiler fuzzer that explicitly reuses bug-prone semantics through features and feature groups. FeatureFuzz extracts these bug-prone semantics from historical bugs as features, synthesizes them into coherent feature groups, and instantiates them into programs for compiler fuzzing. On GCC and LLVM, over 24-hour campaigns, FeatureFuzz uncovers 167 unique crashes, 2.78x as many as the second-best fuzzer. Over a 72-hour fuzzing campaign, FeatureFuzz identifies 122 bugs, of which 106 have been confirmed by compiler developers as zero-days. Among reported bugs, 64 affect release-build compilers, including 9 memory-corruption bugs, highlighting the security relevance of compiler fuzzing in CI/CD settings.