arXiv:2610.20831v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides critical positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services for numerous safety- and mission-critical applications, making it an attractive target for physical-layer attacks. While GPS spoofing and jamming have been extensively studied, GPS Signal Nullification (GSN)-a physical-layer attack that suppresses authentic satellite signals through destructive interference prior to acquisition-remains largely unexplored. Existing wireless signal nullification techniques target conventional communication systems and typically require victim-side information, such as channel estimates or synchronization parameters, making them impractical for GPS. Furthermore, many GPS spoofing defenses assume authentic satellite signals remain available as trusted references, an assumption invalidated by GSN. To address this gap, we present GhostLock, a learning-assisted blind GSN framework requiring only an approximate target location estimate. GhostLock integrates a Blind Adaptive Filter (BAF) with a deep learning-based synchronization module to generate and align an anti-signal using only the attacker's locally received GPS signal, eliminating the need for victim-side observations. We implement GhostLock on a real-time software-defined radio (SDR) platform using GPS-SDR-SIM and GNU Radio. Experimental results demonstrate successful suppression of GPS signal acquisition, establishing the feasibility of blind GSN and motivating new detection and mitigation techniques for this emerging GPS threat model.