arXiv:2610.09428v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We formulate a discrete-time leader-defender-attacker game that combines hierarchical interaction within a protective group with competition against an external attacker. The leader seeks to reach a prescribed demand point while avoiding capture, whereas the defender seeks to intercept the attacker while remaining near the leader. To capture their distinct objectives and asymmetric interactions, we introduce a nested equilibrium concept combining a leader-defender Stackelberg relationship with a Nash-type best-response condition for the attacker. For linear dynamics and quadratic objectives, we derive affine response laws and a backward recursion, together with sufficient conditions for unique stagewise solutions. We further express arrival, capture, and interception conditions as quadratic inequalities in the initial joint state, characterizing winning regions under the resulting policy. A receding-horizon algorithm implements the computed control laws using updated state information. Numerical experiments over randomized initial configurations examine the influence of the prediction horizon and compare the proposed method with an independent-control baseline, illustrating differences in game outcomes and the agents' realized costs.