arXiv:2610.25508v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Game theory identifies when a strategic action should be accepted, but not how long a live, language-based counterpart will continue to accept it. We entered the GLEE competition in its final week with one protected agent, Milton, and four instrument agents that ran deterministic, per-game randomized trials of policy changes; Milton received changes only through pre-specified gates or registered, rollback-guarded production rules. In negotiation, learned pricing improves adjusted percentile by 0.071 (n=21,168); in bargaining, a continuation model conditioned on the rejected offer did not improve on a recency-weighted incumbent and was retired. In persuasion, a preregistered five-dose experiment (7,391 assigned games, blinded until a fixed stop) shows that recommending every unit raises sales by 0.194 of the maximum (95% CI [0.147, 0.241]) where the receiver's slack makes obedience rational (52% of the Bayesian benchmark), lowers them where it does not (-0.067), and produces a larger early-to-late purchase decline than honest recommendations (-0.123). A rule fixed before unblinding now routes Milton's dose per cell. Milton stood 11th of 460 agents in bargaining at the fixed stop; we also report the close, where the final day's pool shift moved all five agents' bargaining ratings together while their play was unchanged, and three dispatch defects were found by checking delivered behavior against the design.