arXiv:2610.22879v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a security foundation independent of computational hardness assumptions. However, its reliance on specialized hardware limits access by ordinary users. Turning QKD into a service poses a fundamental trust challenge, as the providers that supply QKD-derived material themselves could retain knowledge of the keying inputs of users. This makes end-to-end confidentiality solely depend on the trustworthiness of the service infrastructure. We present RAMP, a service-oriented framework that decouples QKD material generation from key consumption. Providers operate QKD infrastructure and supply raw-key materials, while users securely acquire, mask, and locally process them into final keys without operating QKD devices. RAMP employs reconciliation-preserving masking compatible with both DV- and CV-QKD. It mitigates the trust dependence by separating the QKD-service and user-side masking domains. We formalize complementary confidentiality guarantees: RAMP protects the final key even if colluding providers expose their complete raw-key views, provided the masking domain remains secure; conversely, exposing the complete masking state does not break final-key secrecy as long as the QKD source and acquisition paths remain protected. The results establish the dual-domain security boundary of RAMP. We implement RAMP using experimentally acquired QKD data and standardized quantum-safe cryptography. After acquiring service-provisioned keying material, commodity endpoints complete user-side QKD post-processing with an average key-distillation throughput of 2.1Kb/s on an M4 Pro CPU. To our knowledge, we demonstrate the first experimental realization of such service-provisioned, user-side QKD processing, presenting a viable path toward QKD as a service.