arXiv:2508.04281v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are gaining traction as a method to generate consensus statements and aggregate preferences in digital democracy experiments. Yet, participants can introduce critical vulnerabilities in LLM-based systems. Here, we examine the vulnerability and robustness of off-the-shelf consensus-generating LLMs to prompt-injection attacks, which consist of introducing strategically designed texts to amplify particular viewpoints, erase certain opinions, or divert consensus toward unrelated or irrelevant topics. Using data collected from a 2023 experiment conducted in the UK and predefining a majority-rule, we construct attack-free and adversarial variants of prompts containing public policy questions and opinion texts, classify opinion and consensus valences with a fine-tuned BERT model, and estimate LLM--human majority agreement rates. Overall, we find that default LLMs exhibit widespread vulnerability, especially when: (i) disagreement and agreement are finely balanced, (ii) under rational, instruction-like rhetorical strategies, and (iii) for attacks that shift consensus toward positions aligned with GB-unionist conservative manifestos relative to pro-independence left manifestos. A robustness pipeline combining GPT-OSS-SafeGuard injection detection, structured opinion representations, and GSPO-based reinforcement learning substantially reduces directional failures, outperforming state-of-the-art alternatives. While more effective detectors may enable more sophisticated attacks, these findings advance our understanding of both the vulnerabilities and the potential defenses of consensus-generating LLMs in digital democracy applications.