Scoring a "You Won!" Message: The Pattern Checks Behind Our Scam Checkers

Prize scams run on scripts. The wording changes, but the skeleton doesn't: you won something, you were chosen, act fast, and — the load-bearing step — pay a small fee or hand over a code to "release" your prize. Regulators like the FTC count the losses from scams that start with a message or a social post in the billions, and most of those losses begin with text a person could have been warned about in the ten seconds before they tapped.

We built two small checkers around that observation: one scores a pasted message, the other dissects a link. Both are pure client-side pattern checks. This post is about how the scoring works, where it deliberately stops, and what it returns on real inputs — including the ones that make it look bad.

Design constraints first

Three decisions shaped everything else:

1. Pure functions, no DOM, no network. smcAnalyze(message, link) and lrcAnalyze(url) take strings and return { score, tells, level, levelLabel }. Nothing is fetched — critically, the link checker parses a URL with the URL constructor but never opens it. A tool for inspecting malicious links that visits malicious links would be a bad tool.
2. Every point must be explainable. Each hit appends a plain-language "tell" ("It asks you to PAY something…"), and the UI lists them. A risk score the user can't interrogate is just a coloured light.
3. Three levels, carefully named: Looks safer, Be careful, High risk — likely a scam pattern. There is no "Safe" anywhere in the code. That wording choice is a feature, discussed below.

The message model: weighted tells and two decisive flags

The message checker lowercases the message plus an optional link, then runs a table of regex checks through one helper:

function hit(re, label, weight, isStrong) { if (re.test(text)) { tells.push(label); score += weight; if (isStrong) strong = true; } } 

The weights, in order of appearance:

The level logic is one line of consequence:

if (strong || score >= 5) { level = 2; } // High risk else if (score >= 2) { level = 1; } // Be careful else { level = 0; } // Looks safer 

The strong flag exists because addition alone gets the ethics wrong. A message whose only sin is asking for a "release fee" scores just 3 — below the high-risk threshold — yet "pay to receive your prize" is the single most reliable scam signature there is. So payment asks and credential asks are decisive: either one forces High risk on its own, regardless of total.

The link model: read the host, not the story

The link checker normalises the input (prepending https:// for parsing if no scheme was pasted), then works almost entirely on the hostname:

• IP-literal host or a : in the host — 3, decisive. Real banks don't send login links as raw numbers.
• @ in the authority — 3, decisive. Everything before the @ is discarded by the browser; it's a hiding trick.
• Brand name in the wrong host — 3, decisive. A small table maps 15 brands to their real domains (paypal → paypal.com, amazon → amazon.com, DHL, Netflix, Binance…). The rule is exact:

if (host.indexOf(brand) !== -1 && host !== real && host.slice(-(real.length + 1)) !== '.' + real) { hit('"paypal" appears in the address, but this is NOT the real paypal.com', 3, true); } 

Containing the brand name proves nothing; being the domain or a subdomain of it is the only pass.

• Supporting signals: plain http:// (2), a known URL shortener (2), three or more stacked subdomains (2), punycode xn-- (2), the word "bank" in an unlisted domain (2), no visible scheme (1), length over 75 characters (1), three or more hyphens (1), five or more digits (1).

Worked examples — actual outputs

These are the functions' real results (the logic has no DOM dependencies, so it runs unchanged under Node):

The last row is the design in miniature: the score alone (4) sits in "Be careful" territory, but the decisive brand rule overrides — exactly the case a pure threshold would have under-called.

The part we refused to rig

Shortener lists are where a tool like this can quietly cheat, so we didn't: t.co is on both checkers' shortener lists. That's the shortener used by X — and the one used for our own shared links. Paste one of our own shortened links into the Link Checker and it comes back "Be careful: the real destination is hidden until you click." That is, inconveniently, true — for everyone's links, including ours. A warning tool that exempts its author isn't a warning tool.

The same stance produced the rest of the honesty surface:

• Every result carries the note: "This is a pattern check, not a verdict on this specific sender or website."
• The green state says "Looks safer", never "Safe" — a formulaic scam written carefully enough can score low, and the UI shouldn't claim otherwise.
• The link checker explicitly defers to Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal for live checks, because shape analysis cannot see what a page actually does.
• Empty or unparseable input returns "Be careful" with an explanation — never a pass, never a crash.

What this approach can't do matters as much: regexes are evadable, honest messages trip tells (a genuine delivery text with a shortened tracking link is "Be careful" — by design, because the reader genuinely can't see where it leads), and no pattern score can verify a sender. It's a warning light, not a judge. But warning lights are cheap, instant, and private — and for the ten seconds before someone pays a "release fee," they're often the only check that happens at all.

Both tools run live as working demos — the Scam Message Checker and the companion Link Checker — as pure page snippets: no server, no database, nothing you paste leaves the browser.