arXiv:2610.19115v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Any AIS transmitter can claim any vessel's identity (MMSI), because nothing in the protocol authenticates it; only the transmitter's analog hardware reveals who is really sending. We treat AIS traffic as streams of bursts keyed by claimed MMSI and accumulate physical-layer evidence with a sequential test. Each burst is scored by its k-nearest-neighbor distance to enrolled fingerprints in the feature space of a classifier whose weights are fixed after training, calibrated into a tail probability, and accumulated by a geometric-entropy-minimization cumulative-sum (GEM-CUSUM) statistic. The same test rejects unknown transmitters when scored against all enrolled vessels, and exposes insider spoofs when scored against the claimed vessel. A threshold refreshed from genuine traffic alone keeps it at a stated false-alarm rate as fingerprints drift. On AIS in-phase/quadrature (I/Q) recordings captured over 13 days at the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorus), the detector rejects unseen vessels at least 10 days after enrollment. Evaluated over 50-burst trials with every vessel weighted equally, it reaches an area under the ROC curve (AUROC) of 0.956 (95% confidence interval 0.913-0.989), where the best score computed from one burst at a time reaches 0.899. A threshold refreshed from the first quarter of the enrolled vessels' traffic holds 5.3% false alarms (3.0-9.2% across five independently trained encoders) at 88.8% detection. Scored against the claimed MMSI, enrolled transmitters spoofing another vessel are rejected at 0.991, a threat that open-set tests cannot see (AUROC 0.500, chance level). The lightweight Transformer GLFormer, reimplemented from its paper (no code is public) and retrained on the same data, reaches 0.652 in the same detector with its published in-phase input and 0.849 when given the same I/Q input as our encoder.