arXiv:2610.19826v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper proposes a Full Duplex (FD) framework for safeguarding Integrated Sensing and Communications (ISAC) against a passive multi-antenna Eavesdropper (Eve). The adversary is modeled as both a communication and sensing threat, seeking to decode uplink data streams and estimate the surrounding scene. Eve's threat is quantified through two worst-case requirements over a location uncertainty region: a minimum secrecy rate for data confidentiality and a minimum eavesdropping Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) for sensing privacy. We derive the eavesdropping information measures governing both data interception and scene inference, showcasing that transmitting Artificial Noise (AN) can degrade Eve's capabilities through the inverse interference-plus-noise covariance. Exploiting the underlying structure of the problem, we characterize finite-power local and robust feasibility conditions for target secrecy-privacy pairs. The analysis showcases that AN is fundamentally subspace-limited: increasing power is beneficial only along Eve's communication channel and sensing-derivative directions illuminated by the effective AN subspace. Finally, we formulate an AN power allocation problem that is solved via monotone branch-and-bound, and numerical evaluations quantify the AN power required to guarantee joint secrecy and sensing privacy.