arXiv:2610.19051v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coordinators that act on what they infer about teammates are usually certified by the accuracy of those inferences. We argue that accuracy is the wrong certificate, for two reasons. First, the accuracy needed to act depends on what a wrong action costs, so the bar belongs to the deployment, not the module. Second, a module's errors are rarely independent, and dependence has a sign: positively associated errors help where their damage overlaps and hurt where it compounds, so an accuracy threshold fails in a predictable direction, and once wrong beliefs interact and can do harm, no rule based on accuracy is right for every module. We test these predictions in task assignment, Level-Based Foraging and Hanabi, with injected errors, trained and Bayesian modules and five language models, and in human judgments. Accuracy fails in both directions, approving harmful language-model deployments in Hanabi, where shared errors compound, and rejecting beneficial ones in task assignment, where costly errors are rare. In our tasks it also buys far less redundancy than independence predicts: from GPT-5.4-mini to Claude Opus 5.5, error on teammates the models have evidence about falls from 32% to 11%, but the chance that all three observers misread one falls only from 16% to 9% (independence: 3.4% to 0.15%). We propose certifying the deployment, with a Blind-Spot Gate that prices error costs, pairwise interactions and measured dependence without deploying the module. On held-out data from the cells it was developed on, it makes no significant false approval in 20 splits (accuracy: 3.2 per split), and in preregistered tests on modules it was not developed on, it recovers what accuracy rejects (seven classifiers: regret 0.004 against 0.479) and catches what accuracy approves (a Bayesian module: significant false approvals in 17 of 20 splits for accuracy, 1 for the gate).