AI & ML
Statistical Adversaries: Natural Backdoor-like Adversarial Features in Clean Vision Datasets
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2607.05516v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied. We study a different failure mode: naturally occurring statistical signals in vision data that can behave as backdoor-like triggers without being maliciously inserted. We call these signals statistical adversaries. We analyse ImageNet to find patterns that are strongly linked to certain labels. We then use statistical controls to remove random correlations from our candidate signals. Finally, we demonstrate that these signals directly and predictably alter model predictions. These statistical adversaries are more targeted than generic corruptions and transfer across different model architectures. This suggests that some vulnerabilities are driven by dataset structure and distribution rather than a single model's idiosyncrasies. We conclude that ordinary datasets can contain exploitable adversarial surfaces even in the absence of poisoning, and suggest that dataset audits should treat spurious structure not only as a source of bias or interpretability failure, but also as a latent attack surface for vision models.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.05516PreviousConcave is the New Linear: Sybil Attacks Collapse Anti-Plutocratic DAO VotingNextTight Lower Bounds for Differentially Private Continual Counting
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