Backend
Web Agents Should Adopt the Compile-and-Execute Paradigm
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2605.14290v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: ReAct has become the default architecture across LLM agents, and many existing web agents follow this paradigm. We argue that it is the wrong default for web agents. Instead, web agents should default to compile-and-execute: commit to a task-specific program before observing runtime web content, then execute it. The reason is that web content mixes inputs from many parties. An e-commerce product page may combine a seller's listing, customer reviews, sponsored advertisements, and platform-generated recommendations. Under ReAct, all of this content flows into the model when deciding on the next action, creating a direct path for prompt injections to steer the agent's control flow. Compile-and-execute changes this boundary: untrusted data may influence values or branches inside a predefined execution graph, but it cannot redefine the user task or cause the model to synthesize new actions at runtime. We analyze WebArena, a popular web agent benchmark, and find that all tasks are compatible with compile-and-execute, while 81% can be completed with a purely static program, without any runtime LLM subroutine. We identify the main barrier to adopting compile-and-execute on the web: For it to work well, tools must map cleanly to semantic actions, with effects known before execution, so a compiler has enough information to emit a program. The web does not naturally expose that interface. Browser tools such as click, type, and scroll have page-dependent meanings. Planning at this layer is near-sighted: the agent can only see actions on the current page, and later actions appear only after it acts. Closing this gap requires typed interfaces that turn website interactions from clicks and keystrokes to task-level operations. This is an infrastructure problem, not a modeling problem. Web tasks do not need reactivity by default; they need typed, complete, auditable website APIs.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14290PreviousA Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory LifecycleNextA Cross-Modal Prompt Injection Attack against Large Vision-Language Models with Image-Only Perturbation
Related posts
Pod Security Admission audit and warn do not enforce the policy
0dev.to Kubernetes

Best Microservices Testing Tools for Kubernetes
0dev.to Kubernetes
ingress-nginx 退役之後:在臨時叢集實測 Traefik 的 ingress-nginx 相容模式與 Gateway API
0dev.to Kubernetes
Writing Your First Kubernetes Controller in Go: Reconcile, Finalizers, and Mistakes to Avoid
0dev.to Kubernetes
AI Tools Radar, October 2026 edition: 757 open-source AI projects, 51 days of snapshots
0dev.to OpenSource
Lorenz v1.2.2: AppImage updates, winget publishing and CodeQL
0dev.to OpenSource