GHSA-47w9-6r3f-938g: Authorization Bypass and Host Root Command Execution in Canonical LXD and Incus

Vulnerability ID: GHSA-47W9-6R3F-938G
CVSS Score: 9.9
Published: 2026-11-06

A missing authorization and configuration validation vulnerability in Canonical LXD and LXC Incus allows authenticated users within restricted projects to bypass project security boundaries. By smuggling prohibited low-level configuration directives (such as raw.lxc or raw.qemu) inside instance snapshots or backup archives, an attacker can restore these configurations within a restricted project and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the underlying host operating system.

TL;DR

Authenticated users in restricted LXD or Incus projects can bypass security restrictions by restoring instance snapshots or importing backups containing prohibited low-level hypervisor hooks (e.g., raw.lxc), leading to arbitrary command execution as root on the host OS.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

Vulnerability ID: GHSA-47w9-6r3f-938g / CVE-2026-48751
Weakness Class: CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Attack Vector: Network (REST API)
CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.9 Critical (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
EPSS Score: 0.68% (52.67th Percentile)
Security Impact: Container Escape / Host Root Command Execution
Exploit Status: Public Proof-of-Concept Available
CISA KEV Status: Not Listed

Affected Systems

Canonical LXD
LXC Incus
LXD (LTS 4.0 / 5.0 series): >= 4.12.0, < 5.0.7 (Fixed in: 5.0.7)
LXD (LTS 5.21 series): >= 5.1.0, < 5.21.5 (Fixed in: 5.21.5)
LXD (Feature series): >= 6.0.0, < 6.9.0 (Fixed in: 6.9.0)
Incus: < 7.2.0 (Fixed in: 7.2.0)

Code Analysis

Commit: 5aac658

Validate instance snapshots against project restrictions when importing from backup in lxd/instances_post.go

diff --git a/lxd/instances_post.go b/lxd/instances_post.go --- a/lxd/instances_post.go +++ b/lxd/instances_post.go @@ -932,6 +902,56 @@ func createFromBackup(s *state.State, r *http.Request, projectName string, data + // Check restrictions/limits if defined on project. + if restrictions != nil { + err = limits.AllowInstanceCreation(s.GlobalConfig, *restrictions, req) + if err != nil { + return response.SmartError(err) + } + + for i, snapshot := range bInfo.Config.Snapshots { + if snapshot == nil { + return response.SmartError(fmt.Errorf("Nil instance snapshot definition found at index %d", i)) + } + + snapshotReq := api.InstancesPost{ + InstancePut: api.InstancePut{ + Architecture: snapshot.Architecture, + Config: snapshot.Config, + Devices: snapshot.Devices, + Ephemeral: snapshot.Ephemeral, + Profiles: snapshot.Profiles, + Stateful: snapshot.Stateful, + }, + Name: bInfo.Name + "/" + snapshot.Name, + Source: api.InstanceSource{}, + Type: api.InstanceType(bInfo.Config.Instance.Type), + } + + err = limits.AllowInstanceCreation(s.GlobalConfig, *restrictions, snapshotReq) + if err != nil { + return response.SmartError(err) + } + } + }

Commit: a52e5d0

Validate snapshot config against project limits and restrictions during snapshot restore in lxd/instance_put.go (master)

diff --git a/lxd/instance_put.go b/lxd/instance_put.go --- a/lxd/instance_put.go +++ b/lxd/instance_put.go @@ -235,6 +235,32 @@ func instanceSnapRestore(s *state.State, projectName string, name string, snap s } }  + // Build the instance config that restoring the snapshot would apply, so it can be + // validated against the project's restrictions and limits below. + snapProfileNames := make([]string, 0, len(source.Profiles())) + for _, profile := range source.Profiles() { + snapProfileNames = append(snapProfileNames, profile.Name) + } + + snapConfig := api.InstancePut{ + Config: source.LocalConfig(), + Devices: source.LocalDevices().CloneNative(), + Profiles: snapProfileNames, + } + + err = s.DB.Cluster.Transaction(s.ShutdownCtx, func(ctx context.Context, tx *db.ClusterTx) error { + return limits.AllowInstanceUpdate(ctx, s.GlobalConfig, tx, projectName, name, snapConfig, inst.LocalConfig()) + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } +  // Generate a new `volatile.uuid.generation` to differentiate this instance restored from a snapshot from the original instance. source.LocalConfig()["volatile.uuid.generation"] = uuid.New().String()

Commit: 6b93b2a

Backport of snapshot restore project restriction validation to LXD 5.0 branch

Commit: cfd9f66

Backport of snapshot restore project restriction validation to LXD 5.21 branch

Exploit Details

GitHub Security Advisory: Official advisory containing the proof-of-concept CLI commands to bypass project restrictions via snapshot restoration.
GitHub Security Advisory (Incus): Upstream Incus security advisory detailing the reproduction steps using incus CLI.

Mitigation Strategies

Upgrade Canonical LXD or LXC Incus to a patched version that enforces project restriction checks during snapshot restoration and backup ingestion.
Audit all existing instances and snapshots in restricted projects for unauthorized low-level configuration keys such as raw.lxc and raw.qemu.
Restrict untrusted users from migrating instances across projects or importing custom backup tarballs until patches are applied.

Remediation Steps:

For Canonical LXD 5.0 LTS environments, upgrade the snap or package to version 5.0.7 or later.
For Canonical LXD 5.21 LTS environments, upgrade the snap or package to version 5.21.5 or later.
For Canonical LXD 6.x environments, upgrade to version 6.9.0 or later.
For LXC Incus environments, upgrade the incus package to version 7.2.0 or later.
Run an API audit across all restricted projects using 'lxc query /1.0/instances?recursion=2' (or 'incus query') to identify and delete any snapshots or active configurations containing prohibited raw.* directives.