arXiv:2605.07490v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Assembling multimodal large language models (MLLMs) from pretrained components has become a widely adopted practice in the open-source ecosystem, yet the supply-chain risks of lightweight connectors remain largely unexplored. We propose a cross-modal backdoor attack that exploits this gap. By poisoning only the connector with a single seed sample and a small set of augmented variants from one modality, the adversary establishes a compact malicious region in the shared latent space associated with a target output. A centroid extracted from this region then serves as a latent anchor for cross-modal activation: adversarial inputs from any other modality can be optimized offline to reach this anchor, triggering the target response without access to the deployed model. Evaluations on PandaGPT and NExT-GPT show same-modality attack success rates (ASR) up to 99.9%, with most cross-modal settings exceeding 95.0% ASR under bounded perturbations. Experiments on ChatBridge further demonstrate the attack's effectiveness across different connector architectures. The attack produces 0.0% backdoor leakage on clean inputs and maintains weight-cosine similarity above 0.97 relative to benign connectors. Existing defenses fail to neutralize the threat without substantial utility degradation, revealing that a single poisoned connector can establish a reusable backdoor pathway across modalities.