arXiv:2607.00772v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5 million candidate CoinJoin and 23.3 million candidate CoinSwap transactions. Notably, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the operation of coordinator-based CoinJoin services such as Wasabi and Whirlpool. Our analysis reveals consistently low adoption rates, with these protocols typically constituting less than 1% of network transactions, and a sharp decline in detectable usage following key regulatory events. Furthermore, we find no evidence of standardised Stealth Address adoption, indicating a failure to converge on a common privacy standard. This study provides a comprehensive picture of a niche ecosystem whose on-chain visibility has been largely suppressed, strongly suggesting the migration of privacy-seeking users to less transparent and less detectable methods.