arXiv:2611.25324v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Gate-level netlists circulate among IP integrators and foundries and can be extracted from chips. Reverse engineering them into readable register-transfer-level (RTL) code would help an adversary understand and modify a design, but remains difficult because word-level operations are scattered across many gates. Large language models (LLMs) can write and optimize RTL, but often fail to recover it from a whole netlist. We propose LOCA (LOgic Cone Attack), an LLM-based attack that divides an anonymized netlist into logic cones, has parallel agents rewrite them, and assembles compact RTL. Each cone contains the complete next-state logic of a group of related registers, giving an agent a small, meaningful task. Of five partitioning methods tested, only grouped cones lead to recovery. LOCA keeps only RTL proven equivalent to the netlist and measures its quality by compression. Function-preserving obfuscation does not stop LOCA on the tested designs, whereas unknown keys or hidden cell functions prevent it from proving recovery of the original design. Across 21 model-design pairs, LOCA recovers 17, versus 6 with whole-netlist prompting. Per-run recovery across models rises from 5% to 74%, at a median cost below one dollar with a low-cost model.