arXiv:2611.18449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: RFC 6979 derives the ECDSA nonce as $k = F_x(h)$, with $F_x$ HMAC_DRBG keyed by the signing key x. We isolate the assumption its security rests on, A*: at known public key $Q = xG$, the signing transcript under nonces $F_x()$ is indistinguishable from the transcript under uniform nonces. A* suffices, and it is neither PRF security of HMAC nor auxiliary-input PRF security (AI-PRF) of $F_x$. A function $F'(x, h) = P_{Ext(xG)}(h)$ is a PRF under standard assumptions yet leaks x from one signature; the same holds for unmodified RFC 6979 over a compression function that keeps the PRF and dual-PRF properties used in proofs of HMAC, given a collision-resistance premise. A* and AI-PRF are separated in both directions. A* does not imply AI-PRF if the one-bit hidden number problem is hard. Conversely, in the standard model: any AI-PRF can be modified so that it stays one while two chosen-digest signing queries reveal x; under DDH with one public random point, or decisional square Diffie-Hellman without it, there is an AI-PRF whose key is recovered from signatures on two ordinary hashed messages; and a third function, under PRF security and DLP, violates A* while the scheme stays unforgeable. With an ideal compression function, A* follows tightly from DLP in the presence of a randomized-ECDSA signing oracle, and a nonce key independent of x removes the assumption. The secret HMAC message block is $2^{-127.65}$ from uniform on secp256k1, $2^{-32}$ on P-256 and 0.336 on brainpoolP256r1. An audit of 31 secp256k1 implementations finds that 28 sign deterministically without added entropy and that the raw-message deviation from bits2octets of libsecp256k1 before 0.2.0 survives in NBitcoin, dcrd and btcec v2. Low-R grinding needs no assumption beyond A*, and every nonzero Fourier coefficient of the low-R nonce set is below $2^{-116.9}$ unconditionally. We give test vectors for the untested $h >= n$ branch