AI & ML
Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.18126v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Windows Hello is the primary authentication mechanism on over one billion Windows 11 devices, supporting PINs as short as four digits. Such low-entropy PINs are viable only because the TPM's anti-hammering protection mitigates brute-force attacks. Most modern x86 platforms rely on firmware TPMs (fTPMs) that persist their non-volatile (NV) state, including the lockout state, to SPI flash. On newer platforms, rollback prevention of this state is delegated to the flash chip via Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs), a JEDEC-standardized mechanism operating over a physically accessible bus. We present the first practical security analysis of RPMC in shipping x86 systems. Using low-cost interposer hardware, we identify multiple implementation flaws, two of which fundamentally undermine RPMC's security model: First, Winbond SPI flash - the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share - leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching, enabling arbitrary counter forgery. Second, AMD's NV controller does not verify RPMC increments, so an interposer can suppress them unnoticed. Moreover, AMD platforms without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection altogether: on two AMD desktops, reflashing an old image resets the fTPM's lockout counters. Both flaws enable rollbacks of the fTPM's NV state (AMD, Intel, or Pluton), including its lockout counters. We demonstrate this end-to-end on locked, encrypted hardware: our setup finds a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days. A compromised PIN also grants access to device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. The same primitive defeats BitLocker's TPM+PIN pre-boot protector, reducing the worst-case time for a default-length 6-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126PreviousBeyond Bot Labels: Retrospective Consequence-Grounded Ranking of Attributed Cache Harm in E-Commerce LogsNextForget the Lineage: Forward-Secure, Lineage-Complete Cryptographic Erasure for LLM-Agent Memory
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