arXiv:2611.18313v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Urban mobility systems are large-scale networked systems whose performance emerges from hierarchically coupled decisions of public authorities, competing mobility operators, and travelers. Existing approaches to policy design either collapse one of these levels or assume that the authority can model and differentiate through the equilibrium responses of operators and travelers. In this paper, we model policy design as a tri-level game on a multimodal network, in which a municipality sets taxes, licenses, and integration subsidies, a public transport and a taxi operator compete on prices and service supply, and heterogeneous travelers reach a stochastic user equilibrium. We prove that the traveler equilibrium is unique and continuously differentiable in the operator strategies, that the variational inequality characterizing operator equilibria admits a solution for every policy, and that the resulting tri-level game admits a Stackelberg equilibrium. Building on this structure, we design a model-free hierarchical controller in which the municipality and the operators update their decisions from zeroth-order evaluations of observed equilibrium outcomes. On the Zurich multimodal network, operator equilibria computed from different initializations differ by a median of 0.3% in the municipal objective. On a grid of 3,125 policies, only those that subsidize transfers between public transport and taxis benefit both operators, and 24 of them also lower travel costs without degrading the municipal objective. Finally, the controller matches the best policies of three black-box optimizers and terminates at the most consistent policies across runs.