arXiv:2610.12038v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Access control in Internet of Things (IoT) sensor networks usually acts above the physical layer: the fusion centre decides which reports to accept, while the radio of a compromised node keeps occupying the shared channel. This paper places the entitlement in the waveform: wavelet packet division multiplexing (WPDM) builds the channel as a binary tree of orthogonal pulses, and each sensor's reputation sets the depth of the subtree it may use: trusted sensors hold wide subbands, and low-trust sensors hold narrow subbands that the fusion centre withdraws one at a time. We prove that the allocation isolates sensors exactly under perfect timing, and that under a timing offset the energy leaking out of the lowpass leaf falls fourfold per tree level. The locally optimum detector of out-of-subtree transmission in impulsive Class-A noise weights each leaf in proportion to this predicted leakage. We bound the time needed to confine a compromised node and derive the optimal tree depth. In simulation, with demoted nodes radiating within their allocation, the scheme lowers the probability of a false global decision by 68% relative to fixed-allocation WPDM and to OFDM with the same reputation tiers, and by 44% relative to cryptographic re-attestation, which leads once more than 24% of the sensors are compromised.