arXiv:2611.17761v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many cyber-physical systems (CPS) are multi-mode: they switch between operating modes with different tasksets and timing parameters in response to physical events or user activity. We show that these mode changes create a timing side channel: by altering the interference experienced by co-running tasks, they let an unprivileged co-resident observer infer sensitive events, such as a homeowner's arrival or a vehicle's route, from its own execution timing and, on multicore platforms, its core assignment. Existing schedule-based attacks and defenses miss this channel because they assume single-mode systems or target a specific, known victim task. We present STAMP, a lightweight attack that needs no knowledge of task parameters or scheduling policy, and works whether or not the system exposes its modes. On a ZoneMinder home-security deployment, STAMP identifies the modes with 94.7% accuracy on unseen hardware, using under 0.5% of one core. On ROS 2 AMCL with the Oxford RobotCar dataset, it identifies which of seven route segments a vehicle traversed with 86.0% accuracy on unseen platforms. A schedule-randomization defense lowers detection recall to 0.53, at which setting only 53.9% as many jobs finish on time. At higher noise ($\epsilon=10$), on-time job completion reduces to 14.4%, while introducing new leakage in 14.1% of the tasksets.